
For three years, a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group has been quietly exploiting weaknesses in systems used to manage corporate networks, telecommunications infrastructure, and other critical services.
This activity has gone largely unnoticed until researchers at Lumen Technologies recently uncovered a covert network, dubbed Silent Train, that allowed the attackers to move between compromised devices, conceal their operations, and maintain access to high-value targets.
In a report published on October 28, Lumen’s threat intelligence team, Black Lotus Labs, revealed how the group, known as Volt Typhoon, used this network to carry out at least four confirmed zero-day exploitation campaigns and one additional suspected campaign.
The researchers described this operation as a constantly changing network of compromised devices that helped the hackers hide their activities while targeting organisations across the United States.
The discovery also offers a closer look at how Volt Typhoon has been gaining access to critical infrastructure and why the security of enterprise management systems has become an important concern for organisations.
How Volt Typhoon Used Silent Train to Hide Its Attacks
Black Lotus Labs has tracked Silent Train since November 2023, shortly before the disruption of another Volt Typhoon-linked network known as KV-botnet.
Rather than relying on a fixed collection of servers to carry out attacks, Silent Train uses rotating chains of compromised devices, including home and small-office routers, Internet of Things (IoT) equipment, and enterprise infrastructure.
The hackers compromise these devices and connect them through multiple layers, using them as relay points to conceal the origin of their traffic before reaching targeted organisations. After completing an operation, they dismantle the connections, remove temporary files, and replace the compromised infrastructure.
This way, it makes it more difficult for security teams to trace malicious activity back to its operators or identify the full network used in an attack.
According to Lumen, its researchers observed more than 27 classes of devices being used in Silent Train operations. These included TP-Link routers, Netgear Orbi devices, and Fortinet enterprise appliances.
Over the period of three years, the Black Lotus Labs identified and notified hundreds of potential victims across telecommunications, government, defence, satellite communications, critical infrastructure, and education, especially universities with military affiliations.
Four Confirmed Zero-Day Campaigns Targeted Critical Management Systems
The most significant finding from the investigation is the range of management platforms Volt Typhoon targeted. These systems are used by organisations to monitor devices, manage networks, distribute updates, and control access across their IT environments.
Black Lotus Labs identified four confirmed zero-day campaigns involving the following products:
- Versa Director (CVE-2024-39717): The group exploited a vulnerability in Versa Networks’ management platform in 2024. Researchers previously documented the attackers’ use of an in-memory web shell to steal credentials and gain access to downstream customer environments.
- N-able N-central (CVE-2025-8875 and CVE-2025-8876): The attackers exploited two vulnerabilities in N-able’s remote monitoring and management platform, which managed devices across multiple organisations.
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN (CVE-2026-20127): Volt Typhoon exploited CVE-2026-20127, a critical vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN’s control plane that affected trusted peering mechanisms between SD-WAN devices and control infrastructure.
- VeloCloud Orchestrator (CVE-2026-16812): The group exploited an operating system command injection vulnerability in the platform used to centrally manage VMware’s VeloCloud SD-WAN environments.
Researchers also identified a suspected zero-day campaign involving Quest KACE, an endpoint management platform. While limited logging made it difficult to establish the exact vulnerability used, Lumen still assessed with moderate confidence that the attackers had exploited a previously undisclosed flaw. This campaign affected more than 30 victims.
These findings are particularly important because the compromised platforms already have administrative privileges and access to other connected systems. An attacker who gains control of one can potentially obtain credentials, access sensitive configurations and reach devices belonging to other organisations without having to break into each system individually.
Why the Discovery Matters for Critical Infrastructure
Volt Typhoon’s choice of targets raises concerns about the security of infrastructure that supports essential services.
Lumen identified victims across telecommunications, government, defence, satellite communications, managed service providers, universities and critical infrastructure sectors, including water, energy, transportation, and emergency services.
California, Texas, and Hawaii emerged as the most frequently targeted U.S. states. According to Black Lotus Labs, these locations contain strategically important communications, defence, logistics, and infrastructure assets, particularly those connected to U.S. operations in the Indo-Pacific region.
The findings also connect with previous warnings from U.S. government agencies. In February 2024, the FBI, CISA, and other U.S. agencies warned that Volt Typhoon had infiltrated critical infrastructure networks and was seeking to maintain access that could support disruptive operations during a future crisis.
The agencies assessed that the group’s activities were consistent with preparations to disrupt operational technology systems across multiple critical infrastructure sectors.
What Organisations Need to Do to Reduce the Risk
Lumen’s findings highlight the need for organisations to pay closer attention to the systems they use to manage their networks, particularly those accessible through the internet.
Black Lotus Labs recommends reducing public exposure of administrative interfaces, applying security patches quickly, and strengthening access controls around centralised management platforms. Organisations should also retain security logs for longer periods and monitor unusual administrative activity that could indicate unauthorised access.
This is important for managed service providers, whose management platforms can connect them to multiple customer networks, as a compromise of one provider could create security risks for several organisations relying on its services.
Ultimately, Lumen’s discovery shows how Volt Typhoon has spent years developing ways to gain access to strategically important networks while making its activities difficult to trace. With at least four confirmed zero-day campaigns uncovered through Silent Train, organisations have more evidence of the methods the group uses and the systems it considers valuable.
The challenge now is ensuring that these findings translate into stronger protection for the infrastructure that businesses, governments, and millions of people depend on.
